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Communication-Based Attacks Detection in Android Applications
Chuan Ma, Tao Wang , Limin Shen , Dongkui Liang, Shuping Chen, and Dianlong You
Abstract: The Android operating system provides a rich Inter-Component Communication (ICC) method that brings
enormous convenience. However, the Android ICC also increases security risks. To address this problem, a formal
method is proposed to model and detect inter-component communication behavior in Android applications. Firstly,
we generate data flow graphs and data facts for each component through component-level data flow analysis.
Secondly, our approach treats ICC just like method calls. After analyzing the fields and data dependencies of the
intent, we identify the ICC caller and callee, track the data flow between them, and construct the ICC model. Thirdly,
the behavior model of Android applications is constructed by a formal mapping method for component data flow
graph based on Pi calculus. The runtime sensitive path trigger detection algorithm is then given. Communicationbased attacks are detected by analyzing intent abnormity. Finally, we analyze the modeling and detection efficiency,
and compare it with relevant methods. Analysis of 57 real-world applications partly verifies the effectiveness of the
proposed method.
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Introduction

An enormous number of apps have been developed
for Android in recent years, making it one of the
most popular mobile operating systems[1] . However,
the quality of the booming number of apps can be a
concern. Poorly engineered apps may contain security
vulnerabilities, which pose a threat to the safety of
users.
Of the previously reported app vulnerabilities,
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there is a category known as component hijacking
vulnerabilities. These component hijacking vulnerabilities are very common and highly threatening, and
they can cause security problems such as privilege
escalation[2] , intent spoofing[3] , permission redelegation[4] , content leaks and pollution[5] , and
component hijacking[6] .
Prior research has attempted to address some of
the above challenges. For example, some analyses of
Android applications[4, 7, 8] have been made, but they are
largely focused on analyzing application components
in isolation. These methods cannot analyze the intercomponent communication edges, and therefore are
not able to cope with communication-based attacks.
Recent works have attempted to expose and analyze
the interfaces provided by components to permit
interaction[3, 9] , but have done so in imprecise ways.
For example, Fan et al.[10] proposed a secure mutual
authentication protocol to ensure mobile user account
security and privacy. A large body of work[6, 11–14]
focuses on performing analyses of Android applications
for security by transforming the vulnerability detection
problem into an equivalent data flow analysis problem.
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These prior works have all inspired the present study.
In addition, there is a huge number of Android
versions in use on a wide variety of hardware,
and repairing vulnerabilities in applications
involves software developers and users. Even if
the vulnerabilities are found in timely manner, there
is still great difficulty involved in repairing them in
time. Therefore, real-time monitoring of the triggering
of sensitive paths and exploitation of vulnerabilities is
an effective solution to ensure the safety of Android
applications.
In this paper, we consider how applications can
prevent these kinds of communication-based attacks.
Our contributions are summarized in the following four
points.
(1) A method of automatically mapping Android
Packages (APK) into process algebra is proposed. The
complex software systems’ behaviors are abstracted
into the relatively simple subsystems’ behaviors and
their relationships. Moreover, the algebraic properties
of process algebra are used to calculate and reduce the
state space of the model to reduce its complexity. The
state space explosion problem in behavior modeling is
thus effectively solved.
(2) We devise an approach that is able to analyze
Inter-Component Communication (ICC) edges. That
is to say, our approach treats ICC just like method
calls, and acknowledges that both control and data can
flow on the edges. In this way, important intent data
flows can be captured according to inherent Android
properties.
(3) A runtime sensitive path trigger detection
algorithm is proposed that can detect whether the
sensitive path is triggered, and detect component
hijacking attacks by analyzing intent abnormity. We
convert the detection problem to a decision problem of
whether a given path is included in a directed graph.
The algorithm has a linear time and space complexity,
achieves a good level of accuracy and efficiency, and
is suitable for practical use. This method does not
change the original program in the form of third party
applications that detect app behaviors. In the detection
process, our method will allow for users to mark flagged
paths as non-sensitive, resulting in improved accuracy
and efficiency of detection.
(4) The proposed method provides an analysis
method to track in real-time specific paths of Android
systems. It provides a communication-based attack
detection method for users to protect the application
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system, and also a convenient way of testing sensitive
paths. It can also provide a comprehensive picture of
the possible behaviors that manifest during the running
of an app.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 reviews the previous works that are most
closely related to ours; Section 3 introduces the
component hijacking problem; Section 4 describes our
method; Section 5 gives the process of using our
approach for security detection; Section 6 presents
experimental results and comparisons with other
methods; and the paper concludes in Section 7.

2

Related Work

There have been many works applying static analysis
to Android security problems[5–8, 11–14] . Below we
describe those that are most relevant to this paper.
FlowDroid[11, 12] formally models the event-driven
life cycle of an Android app in a dummyMain
method. It builds a call graph based on Spark/Soot[13] ,
which conducts a flow-insensitive points-to analysis.
FlowDroid then conducts a taint and on-demand
alias analysis based on the above call graph, using
IFDS[14, 15] which is flow- and context-sensitive.
However, it does not address ICC. Epicc[16] statically
analyzes ICC and uses an IDE[17] framework to solve
for ICC call parameters, but does not link the ICC
call sources to targets and does not perform dataflow
analysis across component boundaries. CHEX[6] uses
a different approach to the modeling of the Android
environment, by linking pieces of code reachable from
entry points (called splits) as a way to discover data
flows between the Android application components.
Again, however, it does not address data flow
through ICC. Amandroid[18] introduces componentlevel models (instead of FlowDroid’s whole app-level
model) and computes the call graph at the same time
as the dataflow analysis by computing the flow- and
context-sensitive points-to facts; thus its call graph
is more precise, which could lead to fewer false
positives in the final analysis results, but it has a higher
computing cost than FlowDroid. This paper focuses
on critical path detection and real-time detection and
therefore adopts FlowDroid, with the added capability
of calculating all objects points-to information in a both
flow- and context-sensitive way.
Dynamic analysis consists of analyzing applications
while they are running. TaintDroid[19] performs
dynamic taint tracking on Android. An extension
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to TaintDroid handles implicit flows[20] . Dynamic
analyses are limited by the way they interact with the
User Interface (UI); SmartDroid[21] tackles this issue
by combining static and dynamic analyses. We address
this problem using static analysis and modeling of the
component.
Enck et al.[9] investigated how broadcast intents can
leak information and how information can be injected
into Receivers. DidFail[22] introduces an approach for
tracking data flows between Android components,
but the precision of this approach is lower in intercomponent path matching. IccTA[23] identifies intercomponent privacy leaks by inter-component taint
analysis. It is based on a pre-processing step connecting
Android components through code instrumentation,
which improves the accuracy of the results but may
also cause scalability issues. In addition, there has been
many works on ICC analysis[5, 18, 24–27] that are more
closely related to ours but still differ in many respects.
Our work aims to perform detection at runtime and,
moreover, looks to balance accuracy and efficiency.

3

Component Hijacking Problems

The design idea of Android application development
is to treat everything as a component. Consistent with
this, app developers organize their code into individual
application components, each of which completes a
logically independent task or provides services for
other components. The advantages of this lie in the
reduced coupling and increased reusability of modules.
The Android operating system also provides a rich
inter-component communication method to promote
collaboration between applications. The Android ICC
has greatly reduced the developer burden and promoted
the reuse of modules.
However, the Android ICC also presents security
risks; for instance, component hijacking problems
have been noted in the literature[2, 4] . Messages being
passed between components can be sniffed, tampered,
or intercepted by malicious applications, leading to
negative consequences, such as violations of user
privacy and application security policies. For instance,
if an app sends data to the wrong recipient, then it might
leak sensitive data. Many of the threats present in smart
phones are the result of interactions between application
components, not just artifacts of single components.
The communication among activity, service, and
broadcast receiver relies on the intent, and can be a
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one-way or a two-way street. The intent is a message
that declares a recipient and optionally includes data,
and can be thought of as a self-contained object that
specifies a remote procedure to invoke and includes the
associated arguments. Applications use intents for both
inter-application and intra-application communication.
If an application provides the name of the receiver
component appointed by the intent, the intent is explicit.
Otherwise the intent is implicit, and the system will
choose the appropriate recipient according to the other
parameters of the intent; in other words, the name of the
receiver component is anonymous.
An implicit intent presents the risk of a hijacking
attack. An application may end up sending intents to
the wrong application, which can cause a leak of user
information. Data can be stolen by eavesdroppers and
permissions can be unintentionally transferred between
applications. If an application has vulnerabilities, and
its component is unintentionally made public, then
external applications can invoke its components in
surprising ways or inject malicious data into it.
In general, apps with component hijacking
vulnerabilities are not malicious applications, but
can be used to perform malicious behaviors by other
malicious programs. There are two main defensive
approaches: one is to look for the vulnerabilities of
applications, another is to detect suspicious behaviors
by applications. Our work follows the second approach.
Motivating example. To motivate the research and
illustrate our approach, we provide an example of a
vulnerability pattern related to ICC among Android
apps.
There is a navigation application that obtains the
device location (GPS data) in one of its components
and then sends it to another component of the app
via intra-app intent messaging. The intent involving
the location data (Fig. 1, L7–L9), instead of explicitly
specifying the receiver component, implicitly specifies
it through declaring a certain action to be performed by
that component. The second component’s vulnerability
occurs on L18 of Fig. 1, where SendSmsActivity
uses the system-level API SmsManager, resulting in a
message sent to the phone number previously retrieved
from the intent. This is a reserved Android API that
requires special access permissions to the system’s
SMS service. Although SendSmsActivity has that
permission, it also needs to ensure that the sender of
the original intent message has the required permission
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FindLocationActivity(vulnerable)

SendSmsActivity(vulnerable)
onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {…
L15: Intent i2=getIntent();
L16: String number=i2.getStringExtra("PHONE_NUM");
L17: String message=i2.getStringExtra("locInfo");
//should be check permission in here
L18: sendTextMessage(number,message);
}

onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {…
L5: Intent i1 =new Intent();
L6: i1.setAction("showlocation");
L7: LocationManager lm=(LocationManager)getSystemService
(Context.LOCATION_SERVICE);
L8: Location lastKnownLocation=lm.getLastKnownLocation
(LocationManager.NETWORK_PROVIDER);
L9: i1.putExtra("locInfo", lastKnownLocation==null?
"failure!":lastKnownLocation.toString());

HijackActivity(Malicious)

onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {…
L25: Intent it=getIntent();
L26: String location=it.getStringExtra("locInfo");
Intent
Hijacking L27: it.setClassName("com.android.sendsms",
"com.android.sendsms.SendSmsActivity");
L28: it.putExtra("PHONE_NUM", malicious_telnum);
L29: it.putExtra("locInfo", location);
L30: startActivity(it);
}

L10: i1.putExtra("PHONE_NUM", telnum);
L11: startActivity(i1);
}

Fig. 1

Activity Launch

Motivating example.

to use the SMS service.
Due to these vulnerabilities, a malicious app can
send the device location data to the desired phone
number via text message, without the need for relevant
permissions. As shown in Fig. 1, the malicious app
first hijacks the intents containing the device location
info from the first component. It then sends a fake
intent to the second component, containing the GPS
data and adversary phone number as the payload. While
the example of Fig. 1 shows an exploitation of
vulnerabilities in components, it illustrates the general
type of attack that may occur by exploiting component
vulnerabilities within either a single app or multiple
apps.

4 Constructing the Behavior Detection Model
Our analysis is based on FlowDroid, which is a context-,
flow-, field-, and object-sensitive and lifecycle-aware
static taint analysis tool for Android applications.
FlowDroid, based on Soot and Heros, uses a very
precise call graph which helps us to ensure flow- and
context-sensitivity. Using the tools developed by their
own project team, SuSi generates a source and sink list,

where source represents a piece of sensitive data (e.g.,
the device ID) and sink represents a method that may
leak data, such as sending a text message. For every sink
in the call graph, we can use both forward and backward
analysis to propagate access paths to the source, and
mark it as (Source, Sink).
In what follows, we provide several definitions for
convenience.
 Definition 1: Critical events. These are events
containing at least one source or sink events.
 Definition 2: Critical paths. These are paths
starting with the source and ending with the sink
(Source, Sink).
We do not need to analyze all the data flows
along all possible paths, as only the critical paths can
lead to privacy leaks. However, if we only analyze
the critical paths, much data dependency information
will be lost. Therefore, to balance the accuracy and
efficiency of analysis, we must analyze the paths which
are related to the critical path. These are made up of
the component lifecycle path, the critical event paths,
and the communications path between components.
Figure 2 illustrates the architecture of our approach.
Detection unit

Modeling unit
Combine

CEDFG

CLDFG

CDFG
ICC
modeling

Critical path trigger
detection

Result

Attacks detection

Jimple
dexcode

resources

Manifest

Behavior modeling

API sequence

App APK
Android apps

Fig. 2

Architecture of our approach.

Activity
information
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We obtain the Dalvik Executable (DEX) bytecode
file, resources file, and configuration file (Manifest.xml)
by reverse-analyzing the APK of Android apps. Using
the Soot Dexpler plugin, the DEX bytecode is converted
to Jimple, the analysis of which provides Component
Event Data Flow Graphs (CEDFG). In this case, the
component event refers to the callback function and
event associated with the component. Expanding from
FlowDroid and using the resources file, Manifest.xml
and Google’s official Android documentation, the
Component Lifecycle Data Flow Graphs (CLDFG) are
also constructed. Merging the CEDFG and CLDFG
gives us the Component Data Flow Graphs (CDFG).
The ICC model is constructed using the resources file,
Manifest.xml, and cross-border data dependency to
track the ICC caller and callee. Based on the extended Pi
calculus, the behavior detection model is then formally
mapped by the CDFG and ICC models. Finally, the
behavior detection is carried out according to this
model.
4.1

Extended Pi calculus

Since the process algebra[25, 26] can effectively describe
the distributed and message communication features of
the Android architecture, we use an extension of the Pi
calculus[27] as our modeling language. The syntax and
semantic specification of the extended Pi calculus are
defined as
X
P WWD
ai :Pi jP1 jjP2 jaP jŠP:
i 2I
The corresponding meanings are as follows.
P
(1) i 2I ai :Pi is called the sum process, where I
is a finite subscript set. If I D ∅, it is set as 0 and
stands for the process terminating successfully. We skip
over the 0 behind the action in order to avoid ambiguity,
such as the process x.y/. 0 is abbreviated as x.y/. Pi
is guarded by ai because the Pi must begin after the
action ai .
(2) Prefix action a WWD jjŒp.  is a general
action, which does not interact with other actions,
and does not need to be executed synchronously. 
is a synchronous action, which is consistent with
the concept of prefix action in Pi calculus. That is
 WWD x.y/jxhyij , x needs synchronous execution
with its complement actions x. Complement action of
complement action is itself, namely, there is x D x. 
is the unobservable action. Œp is a condition decision
action, and p is an assertion, such as x > 5 and
lastKnownLocation D null. We use condition decision
actions to express this structure (if x D y then P else
Q), and its result is Œx D y:P C Œx ¤ y:Q.
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(3) P1 jjP2 means that if action (x) in P1 and
co-action (x) in P2 are subordinated to synchronous
set A, then x and x execute synchronously, and the
action is expressed with  .x/ after the synchronous
execution, while the general actions  are executed
asynchronously.
(4) The restriction operator aP means that the
domain of the name a is limited to the process P .
(5) ŠP stands for the replication process P . The
replication operators can define the recursive processes,
and they also can describe the process of creating a
runtime instance of an application or component.
Such an extended Pi calculus can describe the
mobility, external interface communication, and
internal state migration, suited to formalizing the
critical path of Android applications and ICC.
Trace equivalence and mutual simulation are the two
most widely used measures of process equivalence. The
choice between them must be based on the functional
requirements of the system to achieve a reasonable
strategy. Since the purpose of this paper is to detect
the runtime behavior to find security issues such as
component hijacking, equivalence relations are based
on the behavior trace; in other words, if two processes
have the same behavior trace, they are equivalent.
 Definition 3: Behavior trace. If the process has the
an 1
a1
an
! Pn 1 !
state migration sequence P ! P1   
Pn , then the action sequence
D a1 ; a2 ; : : : ; an is a
behavior trace of the process P . The set of all possible
behavior traces is denoted by traces.P /.
 Definition 4: Process equivalence. The different
processes P and Q are trace equivalent, if and only if
traces.P / D traces.Q/.
 Definition 5: Alpha conversion. When the name
of a process is converted to a new name; this is called
alpha conversion.
In general, a replacement new name should not
exist in the process. If the name exists, the name
must be changed to ensure no naming conflict. We
use the symbol fb=agP to express the name a in
P being replaced by b. For example, if P D ba:b,
then fc=agP D bc:b, fc=bgP D ca:c, fb=agP D
b 0 b:b 0 .
According to the process equivalence definition, the
corresponding migration rules can be determined. The
most commonly used migration rules are listed below.
(1) INP:
;
x.y/
x.z/:P
!fy=zgP
(2) TAU:



:P ! P

;
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˛

P ! P0

(3) SUM-L:

int $i0;
com.machuan.android.ﬁndlocation.FindLocationActivity $r0;
android.os.Bundle $r1;
$i0=0;

;

˛

P C Q ! P0
(4) COMM-L:

xhyi

! P 0; Q

P

 .x/

P jjQ

P jjQ

4.2

label1:
if $i0==0 goto label3;

;

False

x.z/

! Q0

!  z fy=zg.P 0 jjQ0 /

˛

˛

;

False

P 0 jjŠP
xhyi

! P 0; P

P

$r0=new
com.machuan.android.ﬁndlocation.FindLocationActivity;
specialinvoke
$r0.<com.machuan.android.ﬁndlocation.FindLocationActivity:
void <init>()>();
if $i0==1 goto label3;

;

 .x/

P ! P0

ŠP
Generating CDFG

! Q0

fy=zgP 0 jjQ0

! P 0; Q

ŠP !
(7) REP-COMM:

x.z/

xhyi

P

(5) CLOSE-L:

(6) REP-ACT:

!

 .x/

x.z/

! P 00

.

! fy=zg.P 0 jjP 00 /jjŠP

True

$r1=new android.os.Bundle;
specialinvoke $r1.<android.os.Bundle: void <init()>();>
virtualinvoke
$r0.<com.machuan.android.ﬁndlocation.FindLocationActivity:
void onCreate(android.os.Bundle)>($r1);
$r1=null;

label2:
if $i0 == 3 goto label2;

The following four steps are used to generate
component data flow graphs.
4.2.1
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True

Unlike standard Java programs, Android applications
do not have a main method. In Android, numerous types
of events (e.g., system events and UI events) can trigger
callback methods defined in the app, meaning that an
app can have many entry points. This makes it difficult
to generate a control flow graph for Android apps.
FlowDroid generates a new dummyMain method
for each app analyzed. Each main method will only
involve the parts of the lifecycle that, according to the
app’s XML configuration files, can actually occur at
runtime. Disabled activities are automatically filtered
and callback methods are only invoked in the contexts
of the components to which they actually belong.
Taking the FindLocationActivity in the motivating
example as an example, we can get its dummyMain
method by using FlowDroid, with a directed graph
shown in Fig. 3.
$i 0 in Fig. 3 is a local variable in the stack that
saves state information of the component lifecycle. For
instance, $i0 DD 3 means an activity is running, and
the system is in the onResume method; $i 0 DD 4
means an activity is no longer visible, and the system
will invoke the onPause method. The state information
is difficult to evaluate statically, so we treat it as an
opaque predicate and represent it by p.
Unfortunately, FlowDroid does not handle ICC and
cannot address security issues involving intent passing
among components. Since the goal of this paper is to
detect security problems involve with communication
among components, such as component hijacking,

True

True

False
if $i0 == 4 goto label3;

Generating CLDFG

True

True

False
if $i0==5 goto label2;
False
label3:
if $i0==7 goto label1;
False
Return;

Fig. 3

DummyMain method of FindLocationActivity.

we introduce component-level models in place of
FlowDroid’s whole applevel model. Thus we need
to split the dummyMain method according to the
component, and create a lifecycle model for each
component. We will put onCreate and onReceive as
the entrances, and onDestroy as the exit; the splitting
algorithm is given below.
(1) Search split points. We scan the onCreate and
onReceive methods, and then split using them as split
points. As shown in the example in Fig. 4, when
scanning the onCreate method of the two components,
we take the line number of this method to mark the
split point, dividing the dummyMain method into three
areas.
(2) Refactoring the cross-component jump edge. If a
goto jump position and goto location are in a different
segmentation region, that is to say that there is a crosscomponents jump edge, then
 If it jumps down, it must be a connection edge to
the entry point of the next component; namely it points
to the onCreate method. We will delete it using  as
shown in Fig. 4, and use an edge that points to an area
called the onDestroy method instead (if the method does
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lable0: ...
True

p
Flase
label1: com1.onCreate()

label12: com2.Oncreate()
lable18: ...

lable6: ...
True

True

True
③
×

p
True
①
×

False
True
p

True
①

p
True

False
p

True
③

False
True

False

p

True

p
False
label7: ...

False

False
②
×

label19: ...
p

p

False

4.2.2

False
label20: com2.onDestory()

②
label21: com1.onDestory()

method, we add the component lifecycle methods and
UI callback methods to the figure; we then get each
CLDFG. On this basis, we can work out the component
lifecycle data flow graphs using the data flow analysis
methods presented in next section, as shown on the left
side of the part of each component in Fig. 5.
In order to precisely know the implementation
method of a virtual method invocation, we need to know
the receiver object’s dynamic type, while flow-sensitive
data flow analysis requires us to know how the program
control flows. There is a mutual dependency between
these two analyses, thus we need to create a data flow
graph for each component.

Fig. 4 Components lifecycle by splitting dummyMain
method.

not exist, then we create it), using the red edge marked
2 in Fig. 4.
 If it jumps up, then we remove the edge (as shown
the edge marked by  and 1 3 on Fig. 4), and replace
it with a new edge pointing to the nearest onCreate that
is above goto, as shown in the edges marked 1 and 3
on Fig. 4.
Using the above algorithm to split the dummyMain

Generating CEDFG

We have got the component lifecycle model. Once the
critical events in lifecycle are triggered, it can lead to
the spread of sensitive information. Therefore, we need
to get the critical event data flow graphs.
Drawing on the motivating example, based
on the method of FlowDroid, we can find a
sink (startActivity (Android.content.intent)) in the
onCreate method, and a corresponding source
(getLastKnownLocation in onCreate), so onCreate
is a critical event. Whereupon we use Soot to analyze
the onCreate method, and convert an app’s Dalvik
bytecode to Jimple. This is shown in Fig. 6.

FindLocationActivity

SendSmsActivity
③

①

④
②

True
p

True
False

p

True
False

True

True
True

p
False

p
True
False

True

False

Return

p

True

False

i
False

p
False

p
i
False
Return

Fig. 5

Component data flow graphs of motivating example and ICC model.

<ss:i2, f1::i1>
③
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…
this := @this: com.machuan.android.ﬁndlocation.FindLocationActivity;
savedInstanceState := @parameter 0: android.os.Bundle;
specialinvoke this.<android.app.Activity: void
onCreate(android.os.Bundle)>(savedInstanceState);
virtualinvoke this.<com.machuan.android.ﬁndlocation.FindLocationActivity: void
setContentView(int)>(2130903063);
temp$0 = new a ndroid.content.Intent;
specialinvoke temp$0.<android.content.Intent: void<init>()>();
i1= temp$0;
temp$1 = virtualinvoke i1.<android.content.Intent: android.content.Intent
setAction(java.lang.String)>("showlocation");
temp$2 = virtualinvoke this.<com.machuan.android.ﬁndlocation.FindLocationActivity:
java.lang.Object getSystemService(java.lang.String)>("location");
lm = (android.location.LocationManager) temp$2;
temp$3 = virtualinvoke lm.<android.location.LocationManager:
android.location.Location getLastKnownLocation(java.lang.String)>("network");
lastKnownLocation = temp$3;
if lastKnownLocation == null goto label 0;
False

True

label 0:
nop;
temp $4 = "failure !";
goto label 2;

goto label 1;

label 1:
nop;
temp $5 = virtualinvoke
lastKnownLocation.<android.location.Location:
java.lang.String toString()>();
temp $4 = temp $5;

label 2:
nop;
temp $6 = virtualinvoke i1.<android.content.Intent: android.content.Intent
putExtra(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("locInfo", temp $4);
temp $8 = virtualinvoke i1.<android.content.Intent: android.content.Intent
putExtra(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("PHONE_NUM", temp $7);
virtualinvoke this.<com.machuan.android.ﬁndlocation.FindLocationActivity: void
startActivity(android.content.Intent)>(i1);
return;

Fig. 6

Jimple of OnCreate.

Jimple is a compact, no stack, typed three address
code Intermediate Representation (IR) provided by
Soot. Each instruction in Jimple has an explicit operand,
making it suitable for process analysis and code

optimization.
The temp variables in Jimple start with temp$,
which can only be assigned once, and are unique,
so they can be a reference with constancy to express
data dependencies. We record variable declaration
statements into the data-type table and record the
creation site of temp variables into the temp-creation
table.
Jimple has fifteen kinds of expression statements.
Some are used in the process control flow, such
as IfStmt,
GotoStmt,
TableSwitchStmt,
and
LookupSwitchStmt, and some are used for interprocedural control flow, such as InvokeStmt,
ReturnStmt, and ReturnVoidStmt. In the CEDFG,
we only retain these two kinds of statements as the
basic block. Therefore, compared with the traditional
method, the data flow graph constructed by our method
has a smaller basic block. The CEDFG has edges which
link data dependencies. This is shown in Fig. 7.
To analyze data dependencies in the Jimple file, we
keep track of two kinds of information, defined as
follows.
 Definition 6: Object characteristic. If there exists
a statement such as x D new Object.: : : / in the Jimple,
then x is object. The object characteristic is composed
of fields, methods, and connectors. It is shown by a four-

…
Data-type(variable declaration statements)：

temp$0.init ()
<i1,temp$0>
i1.setAction("showlocation"): temp$1
<i1.mAction,
"showlocation">

<temp$0.mAction,
"showlocation">

com.machuan.android.ﬁndlocation.FindLocationActivity this;
android.os.Bundle savedInstanceState;
android.content.Intent i1,temp$0,temp$1,temp$6,temp$7;
java.lang.String telnum,temp$4,temp$5;
android.location.LocationManager lm;
java.lang.Object temp$2;
android.location.Location lastKnownLocation,temp$3;

this.getSystemService("location"): temp$2
<lm, temp$2>
lm.getLastKnownLocation("network"): temp$3
<lastKnownLocation, temp$3>
Temp-creation(the creation site of temp variables)：
if lastKnownLocation == Null
True
temp <$4,"failure!">

False

lastKnownLocation.toString(): temp$5
<temp$5,temp$3>
<temp$4,temp$5>
i1.putExtra("locInfo",temp$4) :temp$6
<temp $0.mExtras,("network", temp$4)>
i1.putExtra("PHONE_NUM", temp$7): temp$8
<temp $0.mExtras,("PHONE_NUM",temp$7)>
this.startActivity(i1)

temp$0 = new android.content.Intent;
temp$1 = virtualinvoke it.<android.content.Intent:android.content.Intent
setAction(java.lang.String)>("android.intent.action.SHOW_LOCATION ");
temp$2 = virtualinvoke
this.<com.machuan.android.ﬁndlocation.FindLocationActivity:java.lang.Object
getSystemService(java.lang.String)>("location");
temp $3 = virtualinvoke lm.<android.location.LocationManager:
android.location.Location getLastKnownLocation (java.lang.String)>("network");
temp$4 = "Get the location information failure!";
temp $5 = virtualinvoke lastKnownLocation.<android.location.Location:
java.lang.String toString()>();
temp $4 = temp$5;
temp$6 = virtualinvoke it.<android.content.Intent:android.content.Intent
putExtra(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("TEXT_MSG",temp$4);
temp$7 = virtualinvoke it.<android.content.Intent:android.content.Intent
putExtra(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("PHONE_NUM",telnum);

Return

Fig. 7
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Procedure of data dependency analysis.
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tuple, OC=fobject, fields, methods, connectorg, where
connector=f., ::g is same as the connector definition
of C++, by which “.” denotes a member-selection
operator and “::” denotes a domain identifier. In order
to facilitate identification of the object type, we use
the connector link object, fields, and methods, such as
f l:onC reate./ and i1:mAct i on in Fig. 5.
 Definition 7: Data fact. Each data fact is denoted
as hv; ti, where v is the variable (whose type is an object
reference type) and t is a constant, a temp variable, or a
mixture of both.
For example, the data fact hi1; temp$0i means that
variable i1 points to temp$0, which is an intent object
as seen from the data-type table.
In traditional dataflow analysis methods, the sites
of use or creation of objects and variables are labeled
by code line numbers. In contrast, our method uses
temp variables to label this information. Compared with
the traditional methods, temp variables permit more
information because they are a declared data type in
Jimple.
Data facts describe the data flow information of
components. Through analyzing the relationship among
data facts, data dependencies can be obtained, as shown
in Fig. 7.
In Fig. 7, the data-type table and the temp-creation
table hold all the information necessary to analyze
the data dependencies. Following the classical static
analysis approach[28] , the general procedure of data
dependencies analysis in our method is as follows.
Firstly, we get the data dependencies. For
convenience, the entry and exit sets of the basic
block b are respectively denoted by entry.b/ and
exit.b/. If there is a data fact hv; t 0 i 2 exit.b/ and there
is another data fact hv; ti 2 entry.b/ with the same
variable v, then we replace the variable v with the temp
variable t , thus replacing hv; t 0 i with ht; t 0 i. The data
facts to be replaced are called data dependencies. For
example, we replace i1 with temp$0 in data fact
hi1:mAction; “showlocation”i (as shown in Fig. 7)
and arrive at the data dependency htemp$0:mAction;
“showlocation”i. For the intent object i1, we make two
other replacements and arrive at the data dependencies
htemp$0:mExtras; (“network”, temp$4/i and htemp$0:
mExtras; (“PHONE NUM”, temp$7/i. In this way, we
get dependencies of data in the flow which are related
to the temp$0.
Secondly, we get additional information about
the data with the help of the data-type and temp-
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creation tables. By retrieving the information associated
with i1 in these tables, we know that i1 specifies
“showlocation” as its start action and fills its mExtras
field with the “network” and “PHONE NUM” (the
values of which are temp$4 and temp$7, respectively).
Finally, we track the sensitive data. By analyzing
the temp-creation table, we find the sensitive API
“getLastKnownLocation” and its return value
assigns to temp$3, as shown in Fig. 7. Using
this API you can obtain location information,
so we know that temp$3 is sensitive data. By
analyzing the data dependencies related to temp$3
.htemp$5; temp$3i; htemp$4; temp$5i; and htemp$0:
mExtras; .“network”; temp$4/i/, we know that
temp$3 is filled to the mExtras field of i1 via temp$5
and temp$4. Therefore, intent i1 is an object with
sensitive data. Through data dependencies analysis,
we get the transmission path of sensitive data in
the component; the analysis of sensitive data across
component boundaries will be introduced in the next
section.
After data flow analysis, we can get the data flow
graph in Fig. 6, which highlights the relevant part of
each component. The nodes in the data flow graph are
Android APIs or custom methods, and the annotations
at the edge are data dependencies. The “:” behind each
method is the return value of the method.
4.2.3

Combining the data flow graphs

Critical paths consist of component lifecycle paths
that involve critical events and inter-component
communication. We use the data flow analysis methods
in the previous section and analyze the component life
cycle control flow of the motivating example, arriving
at the component lifecycle flow graph. Next we merge
the two parts (CLDFG and CEDFG) to get the CDFG.
Assuming vi and vj is the vertexes of lifecycle
data flow graph (CLDFGcom1 D fLVcom1 ; LEcom1 g),
namely, vi ; vj 2 LVcom1 . eij 2 LEcom1 is the direction
edge connecting vi and vj . If the events in vi are critical
events, vm and vn are the CEDFG entrance and return
points, respectively. The combining methods are as
follows:
(1) Add directed edge ei m to connect points vi and
vm . Add directed edge enj to connect points vn and vj ,
marked by red edges 1 2 and 3 4 in Fig. 5.
(2) Delete the directed edge eij , marked by  in
Fig. 5.
Figure 5 is a data flow graph of the components
named FindLocationActivity and SendSmsActivity in
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motivating example. The left part of each component is
its lifecycle data flow graph, and the right part is a data
flow graph for the critical events. The two components
of the motivating example both have only one critical
event, namely onCreate, and their corresponding
(Source, Sink) is (getLastKnownLocation (“network”),
startActivity(i1)) and (getIntent(), sendTextMess age
(number, message)), marked by a bold red frame in
Fig. 5. The path of (Source, Sink) is the critical path.
After using the above method to combine the two
graphs, we arrive at the component data flow graphs.
4.2.4

Table 1
Intent
type

Modeling of ICC

We can know whether the intent communications
between components is likely to have been intercepted
or tampered with. To identify such security problems,
an analyzer needs to be aware of control and data flows
across component boundaries; this requires a number of
steps as follows.
(1) Extract the fields of an intent object. The
destination of an ICC can be either explicitly or
implicitly specified in the outgoing intent. Table 1 lists
some frequently-used methods of explicit intent and
implicit intent, and fields that can be manipulated by
invoking these methods. The common way of creating
an explicit intent is adding the destination component’s
name (by mComponent) using Android APIs such as
setClass or a special constructor for the intent. An
implicit intent requests a general action (by mAction)
to perform, and the system finds a capable component
which can fulfill the request.
We can extract the fields of an intent object in
accordance with Table 1. For instance, we can get the
data dependency htemp$0:mAction; “showlocation”i
Table 2
ICC caller
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Part of analysis data in the intent communication.
Method

Field

intent(Context, Classh‹i)
putExtras(Bundle/intent)
Explicit putExtra(String, : : :)
intent setClass(Context, Classh‹i)
setClassName(Context, String)
setComponent(ComponentName)

mComponent
mExtras
mExtras
mComponent
mComponent
mComponent

intent(String)
intent(String, Uri)
setAction(String)
putExtras(Bundle/intent)
Implicit putExtra(String, : : :)
intent addCategory(String)
setData(Uri)
setType(String)
createChooser(intent,
CharSequence)

mAction
mAction, mData
mAction
mExtras
mExtras
mCategories
mData
mType
intent

from the statement i1:SetAction .“showlocation”) in
Fig. 5.
(2) Find the ICC caller and callee. We find out all
possible ICC callers and callees, as shown in Table
2, but whether the ICC caller and callee communicate
depends on further analysis of the fields of the intent.
For an explicit intent, we can find the ICC caller and
the corresponding callee according to mComponent.
But for an implicit intent, the Android system finds the
destination depending on the intent fields as well as the
manifests of all the apps which specify intent filters for
a component. An intent filter is an XML expression
made up of an action tag, category tag, and data tag
(which includes both uri and type). The Android system
determines the destination of an implicit intent by

Part of ICC caller and callee.

sendBroadcast(intent i )
sendBroadcast(intent i , String rcvrPermission)
sendOrderedBroadcast(intent i , String recvrPermission,
BroadcastReceiver receiver, ...)
sendOrderedBroadcast(intent i , String recvrPermission)
sendStickyBroadcast(intent i )
sendStickyOrderedBroadcast(intent i , BroadcastReceiver receiver, ...)
startActivity(intent i )
startActivityForResult(intent i , int requestCode)
onActivityResult(int requestCode, int resultCode, intent intent)
startService(intent i )
bindService(intent i , ServiceConnection conn, int flags)

ICC callee

onReceive(Context context, intent intent)

getIntent()
setResult(int resultCode, intent intent)
onStartCommand(intent it, int flags, int startId)
onStart(intent intent, int startId)
onBind(intent intent)
onUnbind(intent intent)
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applying a set of rules matching the relevant intent fields
and the intent filter specification for every component
on the system. The PackageManager has a set of
query...() methods that return all components that can
accept a particular intent, and a similar series of
resolve...() methods that determine the best component
to respond to an intent.
We run a precise action test, category test, and data
test (having both uri and type) to find the destination
component(s).
Taking the example in Fig. 5, we can discover an
ICC caller (startActivity(i1) of FindLocationActivity)
and callee (getIntent() of SendSmsActivity) by the
data dependency htemp$0:mAction; “showlocation”i
and the intent filter information of SendSmsActivity
haction Android W name D “showlocation”=i.
(3) Track data flow from the ICC caller to callee. In
Fig. 5, for the data flow f l WW startActivity.i1/ ! ss WW
getIntent./ W temp$0 ! hi 2; temp$0i, we can get
the data dependencies hss WW i 2; f l WW i1i between
components marked by the red edge 5 . It is easy to
track the data flow from the ICC caller to callee by the
data dependencies.
4.3

Formalized behavior detection model

In order to obtain the formalized behavior detection
model, the various elements in the CDFG are mapped
to the process expression of the extended Pi calculus.
The mapping rules are given below.
4.3.1

Action mappings

According to the syntax of the extended Pi calculus, the
prefix action is defined as a WWD jjŒp. The different
mappings are made according to the different action
properties, as shown in Fig. 8.
The process identification is represented by the base
block number. In general, there is a guard relationship
between the action in the current base block and the
next basic block number; that is to say, the next
base block is executed only after the action in the
current base block has been executed. Therefore, it is
mapped to a process guard like P D a:Q, as shown in
Fig. 8a. In Fig. 8b, the concurrent action record mark
.x/ represents the actions completed concurrently. The
synchronization occurs only when process P performs
a synchronous action x and process Q performs the
corresponding complement action x. In accordance
with Fig. 8a, the synchronous actions are mapped to
the process guard (P D x:P 0 and Q D x:Q0 ), then
the complementary actions .x; x/ are added to the

Q: b

P: a
(a) P = a.Q

P: x

P': y

P=x.P'

Q': z

Q=x.Q'

τ(x)
Q: x

(b) P||Q=τ(x).(P'||Q')

False

R: o.p.

Q: b

True

P: a
(c) R =τ.P + τ.Q

R: p

False

Q: b

True

P: a
(d) R=[P=true].P+[P=false].Q

Fig. 8

Action mapping rules.

synchronous set A. Moreover the synchronous actions
are replaced with  .x/ in the algebraic calculus.
The fuzzy conditional decision action occurs in the
component lifecycle model, as shown in Fig. 8c. Since
it is impossible to determine the trigger sequence of
each callback function, we introduce nondeterminacy,
which maps the trigger action to the unobservable
action  and connects each branch to a sum process with
an alternative operator +. However, the determination
condition decision action occurs in other models, such
as callback functions, as shown in Fig. 8d. Because
our model distinguishes true assertions (ŒP D true)
and false assertions (ŒP D false) by analyzing Jimple
sentences to determine the branch conditions, it joins
them into a sum process with an alternative operator +.
4.3.2

Inter-procedure call mapping

An inter-procedure call will cause the main procedure
to interrupt execution. After the interrupt address is
recorded and the field information is saved, the subprocedure of the call is executed instead. When the
sub-procedure is finished, it will jump to the interrupt
address of the main procedure and continue executing.
There are two key factors to consider for mapping.
(1) When the main procedure calls the sub-procedure,
it needs to know the sub-procedure’s location explicitly.
Otherwise, the data flow graph will have unreachable
vertices. (2) The number of the first basic block in
the sub-procedure is abstracted as the calling channel
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(corresponding to the call edge) with which the
main procedure calls the sub-procedure. The interrupt
address at which the main procedure calls the subprocedure, corresponding to the number of the basic
block, is sent as a parameter to the sub-procedure, and
returned as a return channel (corresponding to the return
edge) after sub-procedure execution has completed. In
all return base blocks, the name can be received only if
the interrupt address corresponding to the number is the
same as the name of the return channel. The mapping
rules for inter-procedure calls are shown in Fig. 9.
In Fig. 9, the addresses of the base block P and Q
are represented by the new names p and q, respectively,
that is, the procedure call address and return address.
Therefore, p and q can be used by caller and callee
as channels for calling and returning, respectively. In
order to return correctly, the parameter p is sent to the
sub-procedure Fun() when the main procedure calls it,
namely qhpi. The sub-procedure receives p by q and
stores it in l, which is a return channel (the value is p)
after the sub-procedure execution has completed. When
the main procedure is received by p, the procedure call
is completed, ensuring that the sub-procedure returns
to the normal calling position. This process can be
formally described as follows:
P jjŠQ D  p q .qhpi:p:Rjj
 l .q.l/:    :l:0//jj
ŠQ
.q/

!  p q fp= lg.p:Rjj
Š l .   :l:0//jj
ŠQ.COMM-L; CLOSE-L/

!  p q .p:RjjŠ.p:0//jjŠQ
.p/

! Rjj0jjŠQ D RjjŠQ:
The process Q of sub-procedure Fun() may be called
by other procedures, so the replication operator ! is
used. In accordance with the operation semantics of

Fun()
Q: Enter_Fun()
Q=q(l).T

Call
P: Fun()

…

P=q<p>.p.R
R: …
…

Fig. 9

T: …

S: return

S=l.0

Mapping rules of inter-procedural call.
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the extended Pi calculus, the main procedure and the
sub-procedure perform concurrent calculus. After using
the migration rules, such as COMM-L and CLOSE-L,
concurrent calculus migrates P jjŠQ to RjjŠQ. That is,
after a series of operations  .q/; : : : ;  .p/, the main
procedure of the application calls the sub-procedure
completely, and the sub-procedure returns to the initial
state and waits for the other procedure call.  .p/ and
 .q/ represent the unobservable actions occurring on
the channels p and q, respectively, and the ellipsis
represents a series of operations in the sub-procedure.
By this mapping, we use the extended Pi calculus
to accurately represent the entire procedure of interprocedure calls.
4.3.3

Behavior detection model

In the Pi calculus, the behavior pattern of the system is
described by processes. The behavior detection model
of an Android application is represented by a process
expression. The process PApp is composed of each
component process Pcomponent , which is composed of
the component life cycle process Pcomlifecycle and event
process Pevent . That is
PApp WWD Pcomponent1 jjPcomponent2 jj:::jjPcomponentn ;
Pcomponent WWD Pcomlifecycle jjPevent1 jj:::jjPeventl :
Therefore, according to the mapping rule, we get
the process expression of the FindLocationActivity
component and its onCreate event as follows:
PflApp D Pfllifecycle jjPflonCreate ;
PflonCreate D  fr .onCreate.fr/:    : putExtra:
putExtra:startActivity:f r/:
Similarly,
the process expression of the
SendSmsActivity component and its onCreate event are
as follows:
PssApp D Psslifecycle jjPssonCreate ;
PssonCreate D  sr .onCreate.sr/:setContentView:
getIntent:    : sendTextMessage: sr/:
As is apparent, the ICC relationship has not yet
been expressed. So we rewrite the process expressions
PflonCreate and PssonCreate based on the inter-component
data dependency hss WW i 2; f l WW i1i as shown below:
PflonCreate D  fr .onCreate.f r/:    : putExtra:
putExtra:startActivity:fshi1i:fr/;
PssonCreate D  sr .onCreate.sr/:fs.i 2/:setCon
tentView:    :sendTextMessage:sr/:
In the process expression, we add an interactive
channel fs for PflonCreate and PssonCreate . PflonCreate sends
i1 to PssonCreate and replaces i 2 with i1 by fs. Because
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PflonCreate does not need to return when it calls
PssonCreate , it does not construct a return channel for
them as for normal inter-procedure calls.
The process expressions of each component are
combined concurrently. The interaction between
PflonCreate and PssonCreate is as follows:
PflApp jjPssApp D  fs .Pfllifecycle jjPflonCreate jj
Psslifecycle jjPssonCreate /

!  fr sr .fshi1i:frjjfs.i 2/:setContentView:
  :sr/
.fs/

! fi1=i2g  fr sr .frjjsetContentView:    :sr/:
In this way, the inter-component interaction is
described accurately by a formal method, and the
behavior detection model for Android application is
constructed. The methods of behavior analysis and
detection are given below.

5

Using Our Model for Security Detection

We take advantage of the open source framework
Xposed to detect the specific API calls of apps. Xposed
is a framework for modules that can change the
behaviors of the system and apps without touching
any APKs. Xposed is a dynamic hijacking project
for the Android platform, and controls the Zygote
process by replacing the system/bin/app process. The
Zygote process makes an app process the loading of
XposedBridge.jar at start-up to complete the hijacking
process of Zygote and the virtual machine Dalvik.
Compared with traditional hook methods, Xposed
offers complete hijacking of all the hooks when the
phone is starting up, and both before and after carrying
out the original function with custom code.
5.1

API of application hook

(1) Extract the target API, and scan the target program’s
component data flow graphs to obtain the package
name, method name, the value and type of arguments,
and return values.
(2) Regard the API extracted in Step (1) as a
message to input, with the beforeHookedMethod and
afterHookedMethod in Xposed used to get the trigger
time of the relevant API, input parameter values,
and the return value. Then proceed to analyze data
dependencies.
5.2
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(2) Run Xposed and monitor callback methods of
the component’s lifecycle and UI to get its run-time
information, such as triggering time, parameters, and
return values.
5.3

Detecting the triggered critical paths

If the critical paths are triggered at runtime they are
likely to cause privacy leaks, so we detect this and send
a notice to users.
By using the method provided in the previous section,
we can capture an API sequence for each component
at runtime. For each API call we capture the triggering
time, parameter values, return value, data dependence,
and so on, thus it has uniqueness and can have a one-toone correspondence with the vertex in the CDFG. This
is shown in Fig. 10, in which the paths of the red edge
are the critical path.
If the path formed by these API sequences is a part
of the whole CDFG and the critical path is included in
the path, this shows that the critical path is triggered and
sensitive data is exposed. An example of this is shown
in Fig. 10, in which the captured API sequence A !
B ! C ! D belongs to CDFG. Since B ! C ! D
is the critical path, sensitive data may be exposed.
We will change the detection problem to a decision
problem of whether a given path is included in a
directed graph. We through the following steps to
determine this, assuming that a given path is V0 !
V1 !    ! Vn , and Gd is the directed graph.
(1) Search the initial vertex. Search V0 in Gd , and if
it exists, move to Step (2);
(2) Determine if the subsequent vertex is in the
directed graph. Search all of the subsequent vertices
of V0 in Gd . If V1 is found, then move to Step (3),
otherwise we can say this given path is not in the
directed graph.

Component

B

D

Get the component lifecycle

(1) Get lifecycle state, by detecting the currently
running task, and determining the name of running
components and their lifecycle states.

C

A

A

B

C

D

...

API sequence

Fig. 10

API sequence and the corresponding CDFG.
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(3) Iterate the decision process. Replace V0 with V1 ,
V2 with V1 , and repeat Step (2) until all the vertices of
a given path are analyzed.
We use the adjacency table to store CDFG; the time
complexity of the depth-first walk and breadth-first
calendar calculation method are both O.nCe/, where n
represents the number of vertices, and e represents the
number of edges. For searching the given vertices in a
directed graph, in general the breadth-first time calendar
calculation method has low time complexity compared
with the depth-first walk, but space complexity is
high. Detection of attacks pays more attention to time
efficiency, so we use a breadth-first calendar calculation
method to search the initial vertex. We give the critical
path trigger detection algorithm as Algorithm 1.
When using this algorithm for testing, when a
critical path is triggered the user will be notified,
and at the same time the model will record the path
information and data dependency information. For
example, when we detect FindLocationActivity in
the motivating example, we catch the API sequence:
   ! getLastKnownLocation.   / ! toString.   / !
putExtra.   / ! putExtra.   / ! startActivity.   /,
because it contains the critical path, and bring up a
prompt as shown in Fig. 11.
5.4

Attack detection

If components i and j in the process of communication
suffer from an intent-based attack, then intent may
exhibit one of three exceptions:
(1) Intent is intercepted: component i has sent an
Algorithm 1 Critical path trigger detection algorithm
Input: API sequence, CDFG
Output: True or False, PATH, log
1: API0 D getStartpoint(API sequence)
2: V0 DBFS(CDFG, API0 )
//Breadth-First-Search API0
from CDFG
3: add V0 to PATH
// The path of API sequence in CDFG
4: for each APIi in API sequence do
//i > 0
5:
if exist directed edge from V0 to APIi then
6:
add APIi to PATH
7:
if Criticalpath  PATH then
8:
log
9:
return True
10:
else
11:
V0 D APIi
12:
else
13:
V0 = BFS(CDFG, APIi )
14:
clear the PATH
15: return False

Fig. 11 Critical path
FindLocationActivity.
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trigger

test

results

of

intent to j , but component j has not received it, such as
in the case of an intent hijacking attack.
(2) Intent is faked: component j received an intent
from i , but i did not in fact send any intent to
component j , such as the case of an activity launch
attack.
(3) Intent is tampered with: component i sent an
intent to component j , but the received intent is
different from the one that was sent.
The API sequence of each component is captured
at runtime, and the process expressions are migrated
according to the API sequence. For example, if an intent
hijacking attack occurs, when FindLocationActivity
performs the operation startActivity to send the intent,
the process expression migration is as follows:

!  fr sr .fshi1i:frjjfs.i 2/:setContentView:    :sr/:
From this we can see that FindLocationActivity will
be returned after the channel fs after sending i1, and
the next step of component SendSmsActivity should
execute setContentView. Namely,
 .fs/

! fi1= i 2g  fr sr .frjjsetContentView:    :sr/:

However, the i1 has been hijacked, and the
setContentView action is not executed, which is not
consistent with the migration of the expression. So the
attack is detected.
Finally, we match the intent information of the
two components, as shown in Fig. 12. If the intent
information of the ICC caller and callee is consistent,
the communication is normal. If any of the above
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i1.mExtras

Pop
locInfo

i1.mExtras PHONE_NUM

Match?
Match?

FindLocationActivity

Pop
i2.mExtras

locInfo

i2.mExtras PHONE_NUM
SendSmsActivity

<ss::i2, ﬂ::i1>

Fig. 12

Attacks detection.

mentioned three kinds of abnormal situations appear,
we raise a warning, intercept, and discard the
intent. Figure 13 shows the detection results after the
HijackActivity runs in the motivating example.
Our method offers real-time monitoring and
identification of the critical paths being triggered. It
will give a notification if the critical path is executed,
and if the path is not threatening to privacy, the user
can tag it as such and the method will remove the path
from the sensitive path automatically. As the number of
the paths marked by users increases, testing efficiency
and accuracy improve.

6

Experimentation and Evaluation

In this section, we analyze the modeling and detection
efficiency of our method, and compare it with
relevant methods. Through analyzing 57 real-world
applications, we partly verify the effectiveness of the
proposed method.
6.1

is built, the running times of the detection of the
critical path trigger and component hijacking attacks are
negligible in comparison, with time-space complexity
of O.nCe/. For the 57 apps used in the experiment, our
approach incurs only a 7% performance overhead on a
CPU-bound micro-benchmark and imposes a negligible
overhead on interactive third-party applications.
Figures 14a and 14b separately present the time
and space taken by our approach to construct the
CDFG for 57 real-world apps. For each app, which
consists of multiple components, the median time is
128 seconds, with a minimum of 2 seconds and a
maximum of 23 minutes and 3 seconds. The median
space is 649 KB, with a minimum of 12 KB and a
maximum of 6.771 MB. The scatter plots in Fig. 14
show both the running time/space and the size of the
app (measured by the number of Jimple instructions).
Figures 15a and 15b separately present the time
and space overhead of the detection phase of our
approach for the 57 apps. The columns show both
the running time/space and the number of apps
which are detected. Our approach incurs only a
14.9% performance overhead on a CPU-bound microbenchmark when the number of the apps detected is 57,
with a space overhead of 20.8%.

Performance evaluation

The most computationally intensive step in our
approach is building the CDFG. Once the CDFG

(a) Time taken

(b) Space taken

Fig. 13

Attacks detection results of the motivating example.

Fig. 14

Time and space taken by our approach.
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leak detection with the other tools on two benchmarks:
DroidBench2 and ICC-Bench. Using our approach, we
build the behavior model for each app and conduct the
behavior detection in real time. The results are shown in
terms of numbers of True Positives (O), False Positives
(*), and False Negatives (X). If a test app contains
multiple data leak paths, the result is shown for each
of them. The DroidBench2 and ICC-Bench test results
are shown in Table 3.
6.3
(a) Running time overhead

(b) Running space overhead

Fig. 15

6.2

Running time and space overhead by our approach.

Effectiveness evaluation of detecting attacks

We use the 57 Android apps to evaluate the
effectiveness of detecting attacks. The results are listed
in Table 4. The values separated by “/” in the cell are
numbers of attacks, where the first value is the actual
attack count at runtime, the second value is the attack
count detected by FlowDroid, the third value is the
attack count detected by DidFail, the fourth value is
the attack count detected by Amandroid, and the final
value is the attack count detected by our method. From
the results, we can see one intent tampering, two intent
intercept attacks, and one intent counterfeit attack were
not detected, giving a success detection rate of 97%.
Although only based on 57 test apps, this partly proves
the effectiveness of our method.

Comparison of benchmarks test

Using real-world apps for comparison is difficult since
there is no easy way to determine the ground truth.
We compare the effectiveness of our approaches data

DroidBench2

ICC-Bench

7

Conclusion

In this paper, we argue that detecting communicationbased attacks at runtime is very challenging. We have

Table 2 DroidBench2 and ICC-Bench test results.
Test case
FlowDroid
DidFail
AmanDroid
ICC bindService1
X
*X
X
ICC bindService2
X
X
X
ICC sendBroadcast1
X
O
O
ICC startActivity1
X
X
O
ICC startActivity2
X
X
O
ICC startActivity3
X
X
O
*
*
ICC startActivity4
ICC startActivityForResult1
X
X
O
ICC startActivityForResult2
X
X
O
ICC startService1
*X
*X
O
ICC startService2
*X
*X
X
IAC startActivity1
X
O*
X
IAC startService1
X
O
X
IAC sendBroadcast1
X
O
X
Explicit Src Sink
*X
X
O
Implicit Action
OX
OO
OO
Implicit Category
OX
OO
OO
Implicit Data1
OX
OO
OO
Implicit Data2
OX
OO
OO
Implicit Mix1
OXX
OOO
OOO
Implicit Mix2
OX
OO
OO
DynRegisteredReceiver1
OX
XX
OO

Our approach
O
X
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
X
X
X
X
O
OO
OO
OO
OO
OOO
OO
OO
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Source
Device ID
Phone Info
SMS
Contacts
Location
Total

Critical path trigger detection
24/24/24/24/24
12/12/12/12/12
18/18/18/18/18
23/23/23/23/23
15/15/15/15/15
92/92/92/92/92

Table 3 Results of detecting attacks.
Intent Intercept detection Intent Counterfeit detection
5/3/4/4/4
2/2/2/2/2
2/2/2/2/2
4/2/3/4/3
8/6/7/8/8
3/3/3/2/3
0/0/0/0/0
0/0/0/0/0
6/6/6/6/6
2/1/1/0/1
21/17/19/20/20
11/8/9/8/9

presented an efficient and accurate method to analyze an
app’s sensitive path at component level. In this method,
we extend the dummyMain method of FlowDroid to
the component level, generate data flow graphs for each
component, and analyze the data flow across component
boundaries. The CDFG is then formally mapped based
on the extended Pi calculus, and a formalized Android
application behavior detection model is constructed.
In accordance with this model, we presented an
attack detection method based on analysis of intents.
Experimental verification and comparative analysis
verify the detection performance and effectiveness
of the proposed method. We found the hierarchical
characteristics of Pi calculus particularly suitable for
the componentization of Android applications, and also
suitable for behavior modeling and detection based on
the communication patterns. It can effectively deal with
communication attacks on the mobile platform. The
abstract characteristics of process algebra can help to
hide the implementation details in the system, extract
the semantics, and obtain the essential abstraction
of behavior. Formal features such as reasoning and
calculus help to automate behavior modeling and
detection. Further research is needed for modeling
and detection in the context of concurrent behaviors
introduced by technologies such as multithreading and
asynchronous calls in Android applications.
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